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Abstract: This contribution compares the transformations taking place in European private 
law in recent years to the transformations first described one century ago in French legal 
scholarship confronted with the interpretation of the French Code Civil in a deeply changed 
social context. That scholarship, epitomised by personalities like Léon Duguit, challenged the 
dominant legal formalism, with its emphasis on the subjective right, insisting instead that 
private law and the state perform social functions. Duguit’s legal functionalism remains a 
useful lens through which to examine contemporary transformations of private law and the 
state in an EU context. In fact, contemporary law is characterised by new economic, 
technological, and societal processes which produce an increased level of complexity linked 
to new ‘transformations’ of private law. This contribution thus highlights the characteristics 
of those transformations separated by a century of legal evolution attempting to trace them in 
the specific area of European private law. A considerable difference between ‘then’ and 
‘now’ is that those processes of transformation that Duguit noted now take place beyond a 
territorial defined state in the context of market-building in a supranational arena. This leads 
to a greater, and unimagined, blurring if not bypassing of the public-private divide. Duguit’s 
‘legal theory without sovereignty’ well describes these developments but is now under 




It is a common theme of legal scholarship that the law, both private and public, is in a 
continuous process of transformation.
3
 Focusing on legal evolution in the European context, 
in particular, it has been suggested a decade ago that private law is experiencing a 
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transformation from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation.
4
 The imprints 
of that development can be found in several arenas, as will also be highlighted in the next 
pages of this contribution. Claims that contemporary law and society is undergoing deep and 
structural change is, of course, commonplace. What is more difficult is to make sense of 
these changes within a convincing analytical framework. When examining contemporary 
changes, one can look back to look forward. Looking back, then, the French legal scholar 
Léon Duguit sketched a plausible account of changes of private law and the state since the 
French Code Civil’s (hereinafter ‘Code Civil’) inauguration. He attempted to apply the lens 
of social science to law in an effort to explain the evolution of private law and the state in 
belle époque France and beyond. Our question is what can we still learn from Duguit’s social 
and functional approach to law in the EU context? And, indeed, what if anything has 
changed? Before this can be done, however, it will be necessary to retrace Duguit’s criticism 
of the Code Civil and its purported metaphysics. 
 
I. Context: The Code Civil at 100 
 
By the early 1900s, the Code Civil had entered its second century. Napoleon’s enduring 
triumph was a product of Enlightenment rationalism and natural law. A bailiwick against the 
worse excesses of the ancien régime, it carved out a sphere of non-domination for the 
sovereign individual. If the ancien régime had revivified imperium in public law, the Code 
now revived the Roman concept of dominium in a recrudescent private sphere.
5
 Thus, the 
sovereign individual whose political rights had been declared luminously in the Declaration 
de droit de l’homme et du citoyen (the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen) only 
a few years earlier found, in the Code, his civil rights from property, family, to contract and 
tort expatiated in some 2,881 articles. These rights were conceived at base as absolute, 
subjective rights. That is, rights that exclude the state from the private sphere of market and 
family. Thus, in the words of the Code Civil property rights may be exercised ‘de la manière 
la plus absolue’
6
 and contracts are acts of the will, private legislation that cannot be easily 
altered once freely entered: ‘les conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux 
qui les ont faites…’
7
 Not only was the state ringfenced, but the authority of the old 
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corporations or guilds were sapped. By excluding the state and corporation from large fields 
of social activity, the great productive energy of society is unleashed as probably the most 




But if the subjective right is a sine qua non for the emergence of a private law society, by the 
early-1900s the mood music had changed.
9
 A century of industrialization bequeathed mass 
labour movements, mass accidents, mass politics, vertically integrated firms, and the gradual 
centralization of power in an increasingly bureaucratized state. By the early 1900s, the time 
was right to reassess legal and social change since the Code. Against this background, in a 
series of lectures given at the University of Buenos Aires in Argentina in 1911, Léon Duguit 
discussed the ‘general transformations of private law’ which took place since the Code 
Napoléon.
10
 In his lectures, Duguit’s primary contribution is methodological. He develops a 
coherent legal sociology, which he applies to private law. His starting-point is that in 
classical legal scholarship the individual, and indeed the state, is given a ‘volonté’ – whether 
individual will or the ‘volonté commune’.
11
 By founding public and private law on the 
subjective right it places individual and state apart from society. But neither conception, 
Duguit argues, is in step with ‘la realité’. Duguit’s commonest refrain is that the state and the 
individual are a priori and metaphysical concepts projected on to law and society. He wishes 
instead to develop a scientific theory shorn of preconceptions, using legal cases and 
legislation as social facts to illustrate his counterpoint: that out of the individualism of 
Enlightenment Europe a social law is emerging.  
By focusing on cases and legislation – constructing his theory bottom-up – the a priorism and 
metaphysics of natural law is replaced by an a posteriori and social scientific method.
12
 With 
Comte and the philosophes he disparages, he views society as progressing in phases; with 
Durkheim, he views law through the lens of social solidarity.
13
 The Code Civil is an epochal 
moment, to be sure, but to grasp contemporary law and society one should not elevate it to a 
totem. Social facts (les faits) vary with the effluxion of time. In Duguit’s words, ‘dans la 
réalité des choses, il y a une transformation continuelle et perpétuelle des idées et des 
institutions’,
14
 and while the text of the Code Civil may not have changed, its meaning and 
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scope varies under the pressure of these ineluctable societal forces.
15
 The Code Civil, then, 
with all its symbolic value, represented for Duguit an important moment of comparison, a 
yardstick to measure how legal reality (la realité) had changed since 1804 not only in France 
but in all ‘civilized’ countries. Leaving aside references to the degrees of ‘civilization’, 
particularly widespread at that time, Duguit project far from a paean to the Code Civil, 
describes a newer and more recent transformation which marks a possible rupture with the 
traditional description of the whole global legal history of that time. Now, it is true that 
Duguit is not alone in theorizing on the emergence of social law. He is part of a realist school 
of avant garde scholars.
16
 What is distinctive in le transformations du droit privé is how 
Duguit systematically retraces the emergence of social law through property, contract and tort 
tying this transformation to the idea of social interdependence or solidarity.  
The greater societal complexity of early 20
th
 century society is given expression in new laws 
and re-interpretations, which limits the absolute rights of the Code Civil with respect to the 
social function. This has led, first, to a new social law mediating group, as distinct from 
individual interests, which reflects how society has developed since the Code. Each group has 
a social function to fulfil because greater factual interdependence necessitates new bonds of 
solidarity. What Duguit recognizes, in essence, is a move from individualism to solidarity or 
‘socialism’.
17
 Duguit issues an explicit and important disclaimer that the term does not 
coincide with Socialism as a political doctrine. Secondly, Duguit as primarily a public law 
scholar links the changes affecting private law notions of contract, tort, and property to more 
general modifications affecting the State itself. Two years later he would go on to publish a 
new book discussing this time the ‘transformations of public law’.
18
 In this sense, and 
following a ‘social’ approach to legal studies which had already taken root in Germany,
19
 
Duguit was able not only to identify an evolution in the law but rather to link the profound 
social and political transformations of his time to the evolution of private law as well, even 
behind the seeming timelessness of the Code Civil.  
That critical link between State and private law transformations, which Duguit first 
recognised, remains extremely prescient today, in particular taking into account tendencies 
towards functionalization on the one hand and the phenomena of globalization, 
supranationalism, and transnational network governance on the other hand, which rather 
appear to be weakening the link between State and law. But appearances may be deceiving 
because, as it will be shown, transformation does not imply displacement. For these reasons, 
the rest of this contribution will attempt to re-read Duguit’s transformations and relate them 
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to the more recent transformations taking place in our current European society, 100 years 
after that move was first described. Before focusing squarely on contemporary European 
private law, in homage to Duguit’s method, we will retrace twentieth-century law as our 
yardstick – like Duguit, looking back to look forward. 
  
II. The Birth of the Social: Private Law and La Fonction Sociale 
 
Léon Duguit was a professor in Public law at the University of Bordeaux in the same period 
in which Émile Durkheim lectured on social sciences at the same university and laid the 
foundations of sociology as an autonomous science. Leaving aside some differences between 
their approaches,
20
 it is perhaps unsurprising that the two professors shared some common 
beliefs concerning the relationship between law and society. More precisely, Durkheim in 
social science and Duguit in legal science contested the universality of the law – and in 
particular of the Code Civil – rather suggesting that the law depended on society and evolved 
with it. Most importantly, Durkheim and Duguit share a common supposition that social facts 
such as the law must be explained in terms of their contribution to social integration. This 
requires setting aside a priori natural law concepts. A second shared supposition is that the 
more complex the society, the more private law is the means through which social solidarity 
is achieved. By examining the transformation of private law as datum, then, a window is 
opened onto the contemporary form social solidarity or interdependence takes.  
The way concepts such as property, contract, tort, state and so on have evolved in legal 
practice then enables the social scientist to draw broader conclusions about societal 
integration. In bel époque France, where the universal ideals of Enlightenment and an 
authoritative view of sovereignty had already been merged within the framework of the Code 
civil, the legal repercussions of the sociological approach were likely to be received with 
suspicion or even hostility among traditional lawyers. Unperturbed, Duguit in 
Transformations du droit privé, declared that the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du 
citoyen of 1789 and the Code Napoléon the main principles on which those texts were based, 
national sovereignty and the natural right of the individual, were in fact ‘already dead’.
21
 
Duguit arrived at his conclusion by examining social facts, namely the evolution of case-law 
and legislation from the Code onwards. 
Thus, in his sixth lecture on propriety he documented a long list of limitations to the right of 
property, otherwise traditionally construed as ‘absolute’, which were continuously posed by 
the state whenever a public interest in intervening on private ownership emerged.
 22
 One of 
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his main examples is la loi du 28 juillet 1885, and also la loi du 15 juin 1905. These laws 
allowed the state to install telephone technical infrastructure on private land without 
indemnity unless damage is caused. Such laws reflect how the formerly absolute right to 
property is increasingly qualified by the need to reconcile individual and group interests in 
society. Critical infrastructure in the social interest cannot be compromised by antiquated 
notions of property as exclusive right. The idea of a ‘social function’ of propriety would later 
on become a common theme in legal scholarship particularly in the aftermath of World War 
II, up to the point that the term was recognised even in constitutional charters, as notably the 
Italian Constitution of 1946-48, as well as, following a particular development which will be 
discussed in the next pages, in the European Union. 
While the idea of ‘social function’ has been most discussed with regard to property, the same 
principle also applies to other areas of private law, including contract and torts. With regard 
to contracts, and more broadly l’acte juridique, the autonomy of the individual is recognized 
and safeguarded by the law only insofar as the ‘goal’ pursued by the individual is deemed 
worthy of protection by the legal system. It is not even sufficient that the goal is lawful, what 
is now required is that the pursued goal is one of ‘solidarité sociale’, a goal having ‘une 
valeur sociale’.
23
 Duguit’s analysis goes further, in fact, by focusing on the empirical reality 
of the market of that time, in which technology and automatization were creating new forms 
of contracting. Thus, he describes phenomena like the ‘contracts of adhesion’ and ‘collective 
contracts’ with the latter manifest both in ‘concession de service public’ and ‘collective 
labour contract’.
24
 In those cases, Duguit claims that it is hard to apply the traditional 
category of ‘contract’ as based on private autonomy without subterfuge. Instead, Duguit 
refers to these contract forms as ‘convention-loi’, a hybrid between agreement and 
legislation. Similar developments had already troubled Durkheim, who noted that ‘tout n’est 
pas contractuel dans le contrat’,
25
 mentioning immediately afterwards – this time in possibly 
more conservative terms – that the only arrangements to be called contracts are those which 
have been freely agreed upon by the parties. A few years later, the private law scholar 
Emmanuel Lévy
26
 would go one step further by noticing that in fact ‘tous les contrats ont 
quelque chose de collectif’.
27
  
It is describing these new forms of ‘contracts’ (les faits), as termed by traditional scholarship, 
that Duguit was able to draw a parallel between the evolution of the State and of private law: 
‘de même que disparaît l’autonomie de l’individu, de même disparaît la souveraineté de 
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 The concession of public service contract illuminates the that the very role of the 
State was changing. By examining legal practice, as opposed to scholarly exegesis on the 
subjective right, it became clear that the state had transformed from the night watchman of 
the nineteenth century. The old-school liberalism with its abstract notion of imperium 
appeared inaccurate. Newer regulatory objectives demanded a more interventionist state, 
which was better described in functional than sovereigntist terms.
29
 New elements such as 
most notably technological advancements and new social expectations created by them 
(‘[t]he time is not far distant when every house will demand electric light’,
 30
  says Duguit), 
create a new need for the State to be actively involved in the provision of those services. In 
this respect, the main ideas of Duguit are expressed in his writings dealing more specifically 




The radical idea of Duguit is that a conceptualization of the State should do away with the 
notion of sovereignty. That concept appeared misplaced for a plurality of social and legal 
reasons. On the one hand, the pretense of making sovereignty reside in the nation appeared 
doubtful looking at the geopolitical reality; on the other hand, sovereignty is based on a 
notion of imperium, which does not appear to reflect the way in which the State concretely 
operated in society. In fact, the State will have, as it was beginning to do from the end of the 
nineteenth century and more obviously at the start of the twentieth, to provide individuals 
basic services like postal services, public light, transport, instruction. In this context, the State 
mostly has to ‘organise’ society rather than simply ‘defending’ it: ‘the ruling class to-day 
must not only abstain from certain things, but must perform other things’.
32
 To do that, the 
State might also require new forms of interaction with contracts. The idea of ‘public service’ 
should thus be the new basis of modern public law.
33
  
If the transformation of contract and property is linked very closely to the changing role or 
function of state, tort law takes on a greatly enhanced position vis-à-vis these more 
established bodies of law. It will be recalled that while the Code Civil devotes 853 articles 
directly to property and contract, tort law (delict) is given short treatment in four articles:
34
 
articles 1382-86. The core idea of classical tort law is that it is only those harms caused by 
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another’s subjective fault that give rise to non-contractual liability.
35
 This is set out succinctly 
in Article 1382: ‘Tout fait quelconque de l’homme, qui cause à autrui un dommage, oblige 
celui par la faute duquel il est arrivé à le réparer’.
36
 As Duguit argues, this concept of delict 
is consistent with the general commitments in the Code Civil: it is concerned with subjective 
fault or, in other words, the acting individual in the world who, deliberately or through his 
imprudence, harms another individual. Unless the harms that befall an individual can be 
imputed to the acts of another, then the loss lies where it falls as a consequence of fortuna or 
a lack of self-help.
37
 However, tort law is not immune from the transformation of state and 
society. What social function, then, does tort law fulfil? For Duguit, the key conceptual move 
is from individual, subjective ‘imputabilité’ to managing objective, social ‘risque’.
38
 
Classical, interpersonal law has not entirely disappeared, to be sure, but it has been 




The most telling manifestation of this shift is from individual fault to strict liability for 
incidental accidents of industrialization.
40
 Duguit takes the loi du 9 avril 1898 (workplace 
accidents) as illustrating a deeper point. This law, very similar to those implemented 
throughout the industrialised West, effectively indemnified workers for workplace accidents 
by obliging employers to compensate them without proof of fault. The deeper point is that the 
drift of modern law is towards making those who introduce a risk liable for the accidents that 
are caused when these risks materialize in harm.
41
 While society as a whole benefits from 
group activity, the members of these groups benefit more directly from their activities: ‘Si 
celui-ci en a le bénéfice immédiate, il est juste qu’il supporte le risque que fait courir aux 
individus et aux autres groupes la mise en œuvre de cette activité.’
42
 Today, we refer to this 
as strict enterprise  liability. Duguit’s primary focus was on the idea that the groups that cause 
accidents are also those that benefit from these activities and his concept is of social justice 
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for risk creation by groups. Consistent with his critique of imperium, the state in this view is 
also a group and liability should be placed at its door as much as that of enterprises. Neither 
‘metaphysical’ concepts of dominium or imperium should obscure the fact that group 
activities generate social risks, which following his idea of interdependence should be 
assumed by the risk creator.
43
  
His group-based theory is cogent if one focuses on the defendants of a tort action as 
placeholders for manufacturers, employers, the state, all of which now have social duties to 
fulfil. Duguit’s contribution is remarkably prescient because, together with contemporaries 
such as Saleilles and Josserand, he notes that tort law in the 20
th
 century became a form of 
social or regulatory law.
44
 While it is true that enterprise strict liability never fully or 
unambiguously displaced individual fault, it created a second track of ‘organizational 
liability’. Duguit’s blindspot, as we noted, is that if tort law is about dividing managing risks, 
between those groups who create risk and those who suffer their consequences, he 
underestimates that responsibility for causation (social justice) is not necessarily the only or, 
indeed, most effective way to divide risk. In other words, the ‘socialisation du droit’ does not 
flow only towards strict liability.
45
 This ‘blindspot’ a consequence of his method, which 
attempts to explain all law as attempts to achieve social integration. His second prescient 
observation is that state sovereignty is a priori and metaphysical concept and it should not 
exclude the development of tort law principles where its activities result in harm to 
individuals. These observations helped concretise a distinct state liability law in France and 
beyond. Once again, like his researches on property and contract, Duguit envisions an 
emerging organizational form of liability founded on social solidarity, which does not 
distinguish between state or private actors. All are submitted to the need of rules for social 
interdependence. 
Thus, by tracing changes to property, contract and tort (les faits) Duguit is able to note the 
changing role and function of state and society. Both the emergence of public services as the 
new goal of the State and the social function in the area of private law are both manifestation 
of the same basic truth: law is a manifestation of social solidarity and it is based on social 
interdependence
46
 rather than individualism. For that reason, the system encapsulated in the 
Code Civil, regardless of its persistent black-letter rules, is no longer a reflection of the reality 
of the law, as it stands, or its underlying ethic of social justice.  
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III. The turn of the twenty-first century: Law and Society 
Above and Beyond the State 
 
The twentieth century belonged to the social, but does the twenty-first? Duncan Kennedy 
suggests that, after the second globalisation of legal thought consisting in the success of ‘the 
social’, the law has more recently steered away from that phase, introducing a new era, or a 
third globalization of legal thought, whose contours appear less clearly defined as the one of 
the preceding phases.
47
 If that is true and the ‘social’ is disappearing - most manifest in the 
alleged crisis of the welfare state, which represented the clearest recognition of the rationality 
of the social -
48
 is the analysis of Duguit still of any use to conceptualize a very different 
historical period characterized by a redefinition of legal thought and the eclipse of the State 
by functional transnational networks? How much of the ideas of interdependence and social 
function still play a role in particular in the current European law scenario? 
One should start from the fundamental contribution of Duguit regarding the recognition of 
the link between private law and the State – as the law depends on society and the State 
represents the organized form of society. If Duguit noted that ‘we have witnessed in the last 
half of the nineteenth century an immense economic change’,
49
 equally important changes 
took place in the twentieth, of again a technological, economic and in consequence societal 
nature. This has led to the emergence of newer goals which are pursued by public institutions. 
On closer inspection, this trend does not contradict Duguit’s intuition. The French professor 
recognized that it was impossible to ultimately create a list of legitimate ends for the State to 
pursue: that would depend on the political and social needs of a particular moment, so that it 
would be perfectly acceptable that overtime a new society would develop newer ends. 
Claiming the contrary would negate the whole idea of legal transformation and absolutize 
certain public law principles, running against the whole starting point of the social 
dependence of the law. And, indeed, running against Duguit’s scientific method. Private law 
in that view will always be open to the pursuit of further public policy objectives, as its 
internal rationality, now just like at Duguit’s time, cannot be described as entirely self-
contained and fully autonomous.  
To be sure, the debate between autonomists and instrumentalists is still very much alive, and 
while it is generally conceded that private autonomy does not exist in a vacuum, some public 
policy objectives might be deemed to be legitimate as functionalizations of private autonomy 
                                                 
47
 D. Kennedy, ‘Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000’ in D.M. Trubek (ed), The New 
Law and Economic Development. A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 19-73. 
48
 M. Camdessus, ‘Worldwide Crisis in the Welfare State: What next in the context of Globalization?’ Address 
by the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund at a seminar organized by Observatoire Chrétien 
des Réalités Economiques Paris, France, October 15, 1998. 
49
 L. Duguit, (n 20) XLII. 
 
11 
while others might not.
50
 Without delving into those debates, it can only be mentioned in this 
place that as new state policies develop, these interventions might be coloured by various 
ideological considerations, depending on the direction in which the State will want to steer 
individual behavior. Thus, the use of terms like ‘the social’, ‘socialisation’, or even 
‘socialism’ should not mislead us, as Duguit himself had warned us: the State might pursue 
objectives which are not ‘socialist’ at all in political terms but still based on the idea that one 
should pursue a ‘social function’. A clear example of this possibility appeared few years after 
Duguit: fascism admitted the functionalization of individual conduct up to the suppression of 
freedom for overarching public reasons. In light of this, the preoccupation of Duguit of 
highlighting that ‘socialism’ did not refer to the political notion becomes particularly 
relevant, as the social does not coincide with the welfarist. 
The second aspect in which the thought of Duguit is both actual and outdated resides in the 
role of the State in the economy. Describing the current tendencies of his time, Duguit 
predicted a growing involvement of the State in the regulation of private affairs. In his view, 
the state would become more and more involved in the provision of public services. In that 
regard, more recent trends showed that in fact the state has, up to a certain extent, withdrawn 
from the direct provision of those services. In the third wave described by Kennedy, the State 
has started relying more strongly on the market itself as the means through which social goals 
may be achieved. Services such as transport, education, energy, to name just a few, have in 
more recent years been outsourced to the market by privatization and liberalization. This has 
happened against the background of rising new economic ideals highlighting the importance 
of free markets as well as processes of transnationalisation of the economy, which seem to 
suggest an overall shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’.
51
 Various attempts have been 
made in the literature to reconceptualize the role of private law in this changed ‘after-Welfare 
State’ context, in which the fading of the State let the question arise as to who should in 
practice functionalize private law.
52
 Even if this development would appear to prove Duguit’s 
prediction wrong, on a closer look this does not appear to be the case.  
In the first place, the current trends of transnationalisation and globalization confirm the loss 
of centrality of the notion of sovereignty as intended to be a prerogative of the nation and 
thus of the revolutionary nation-State. The current global scenario proves the increasing 
problems with a conception of statehood which makes the law coincide with the imposition 
of a State embodying a sovereign nation. Two tendencies appear relevant in that respect: 
supranationalism, as the development of institutions like the European Union which produce 
an increasing amount of law and regulation impacting private relations; and transnationalism, 
                                                 
50
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as the norms produced by non-State actors beyond traditional systems of national law 
making. Both developments pose a threat to an exclusively national conception of 
sovereignty as the one referred to by classical conceptions of public law, which indeed reveal 
to be ill-placed to make sense of the rules produced in those venues, sometimes hardly 
definable as ‘law’ despite their occasionally considerable prescriptive significance. While this 
breaks the link between State and private law, it does not so with the more fundamental one 
between law and society, even if poses a challenge to it.  
Alternative conceptualizations have been proposed, overcoming the public/private distinction 
and suggesting ‘polycontexturality’ as the relevant approach.
53
 At all events, this does not 
contradict the transformation described one century ago, as the starting point of those 
analyses was in fact not the State per se but rather society. For Durkheim, in fact, the political 
society is ‘the complex group of which the state is the highest organ’,
54
 which does not mean 
that the State is the only form of social organization capable of exerting power or possibly 
functionalizing individual behaviors.
55
 It is furthermore worth noting that these developments 
have not led to the extinction or an obsolescence of the concept of the State. Rather than 
disappearing, economists and political scientists alike rather point out to a redefinition of its 
role. In that sense, Stiglitz has spoken of how globalization impacted on the economic role of 
the State,
56
 while a new strain of research has emphasized the importance of State support in 
the development of even the most innovative technological industries.
57
 In short, neither the 
state nor private law have disappeared; they have instead transformed.  
In the second place, those developments had impacted directly on the ‘social function’ of 
private law. The retreat of the state from the provision of public services has coincided with 
an increase of the supervision and regulation of the private actors who provide those services 
in the market – regardless of their organization in the form of a nation-State or not. The 
societal expectation in the provision of services has not disappeared and might have on the 
contrary rather augmented, but those demands might have to be satisfied by non-state actors. 
The development went much beyond what Duguit introduced: in his view, the main 
functionalization took place in the realm of property law, while the most relevant 
developments in the area of contract consisted with contracts of adhesion and collective 
contract. We now clearly witness a functionalization of private autonomy as well, while 
analogous developments take place in tort law. A few examples drawn from the European 
supranational experience will clarify this point. 
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IV. Functionalisation of contract law 
 
Private law has historically been employed as a nation-building and a market-building tool. 
The unification of law through the recognition of some basic principles allowed for the 
construction of nationally unified markets and later industrialization, while it also served the 
symbolic need of unity necessary to the creation of the State.
58
 Relatively more recently, 
attempts have been made to create private law codes at a supranational level.
59
 While the 
Euronationalist attempt to propose the symbolic value of private law unification at the 
European level has revealed to be an unfortunate attempt which has produced more resistance 
and hostility than acceptance, the function of market-building has been definitely more 
successful. The recognition of the four fundamental freedoms at the level of the Treaties had 
the immediate effect of extending party autonomy across European national borders, 
allowing private individuals and companies to more easily engage in contractual relations 
with other subjects in other European countries.
60
 As this result was initially reached through 
the market freedoms, later on the process of creeping constitutionalisation of EU law created 
new umbrella principles allegedly encompassing freedom of contract. Art 16 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU in particular acknowledges a ‘freedom to conduct a 
business’ which was soon tested by scholarship and the CJEU as the possible constitutional 
anchorage for the protection of freedom of contract. This was made explicitly clear in 2013 in 
the case of Sky Österreich case when the CJEU stated that the freedom ‘covers the freedom 
to exercise an economic or commercial activity, the freedom of contract and free 
competition’.
61
 All this would point in the direction of an increased reliance on freedom of 
contract and thus a return to the autonomy of the will of the individuals, back to a liberal 
individualistic conception of freedom of contract removed from the ‘social’ discourses of the 
1900s. That is undoubtedly an aspect of the process of constitutionalisation of private 
autonomy, which has already led to criticism in the literature with specific regard to its 
repercussions in the area of labour law and must not be underestimated.
62
  
At the same time, nonetheless, the process of constitutionalisation leads to further 
consequences. The first aspect, obviously, is the need to balance constitutional rights, so that 
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freedom of contract will have to be interpreted also in light of other principles, possibly of a 
welfarist nature such as most notably the case of the right of housing.
63
 More fundamentally, 
that balancing exercise is the demonstration that the constitutionalisation means that freedom 
of contract will also have to be construed in light of the other goals pursued in the EU. This 
aspect becomes clear looking at the evolution of the concept in the case law of the CJEU. If 
Sky Österreich expressed the principle in the clearest terms in 2013, in fact the 
constitutionalisation, or rather marketization, of autonomy, goes back to an older time. The 
case of Nold in 1974 is revealing. The case originated from the complaint of a German coal 
dealer that a decision of the European institutions restricting its economic freedom was 
infringing on freedoms safeguarded by the German Constitution, including personal freedom 
(Art 2) and right to private property (Art. 14).  
Leaving partially aside the important constitutional dimension of the dispute and focusing on 
its private law aspect, the complaint was thus apparently based on an individualist notion of 
the protection of freedom of contract according to which this should embed the power of an 
individual to do whatever it pleases. A form of ‘negative’ freedom to put it in Berlin’s 
famous terms.
64
 And yet, the European Court of Justice rejected that interpretation, on the 
contrary pushing towards a ‘positive’ notion of freedom of contract which recognizes its 
functionality to overall social ends and values. The Court stated that ‘if rights of ownership 
are protected by the constitutional laws of all the Member States and if similar guarantees are 
given in respect of their right freely to choose and practice their trade or profession, the rights 
thereby guaranteed, far from constituting unfettered prerogatives, must be viewed in the light 
of the social function of the property and activities protected thereunder’.
65
 Thus, already 
from the 1970s, as economic freedoms are recognized they are also subjected to the 
limitations imposed, again, by the ‘social function’ of property. The social function is 
nonetheless less rooted in notions of social justice and more in a market-building project. 
The same reasoning, now covered by references to the freedom to conduct a business, has 
been employed to advance a variety of relevant aims of the EU. These have ranged from 
more traditionally ‘welfarist’ goals such as the protection of the worker,
66
 to more recent 
attempts to regulate the developing information society.
67
 In all these instances, the Court of 
Justice has not taken an a priori stance either in support or against freedom of contract but 
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has rather expanded or restricted it considering its particular social function. In fact, the Court 
has constantly referred to its new classic formula: ‘freedoms are not absolute rights, however, 
but must be considered in relation to their social function. Consequently, restrictions may be 
imposed on their exercise provided that the restrictions correspond to objectives of general 
interest and do not constitute in relation to the aim pursued a disproportionate and intolerable 
interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed’.
68
 It is in light of these 
considerations that it has been suggested in legal scholarship that private autonomy in the EU 
while it is on the one hand recognized it is on the other hand necessarily ‘framed’
69




The notion of social function of property thus lies at the core of the later development of the 
European case law functionalizing even private autonomy. It would nonetheless be incorrect 
to infer the whole evolution of a concept from just the case-law. Quite to the contrary, Duguit 
showed that the main functionalization was coming from an increase of special statutes 
outside the code, and at the present day the most evident instrumentalization of private 
autonomy is operated again by regulation – often including also the activities of independent 
regulatory agencies – to which the approach of the CJEU has offered legal justification 
through the above-mentioned decisions. Again, the areas which have been interested by 
phenomena of liberalization and (only seeming) deregulation offer the clearest examples of 
that trend. The various directives issued by the EU in the area of private law also present the 
same aspect when it comes to the autonomy of the individuals: they are in the first place 
expanding it to the extent that they are meant to build an internal market, but they often do 
that posing series of conditions to the way in which that freedom has to be exercised.  
Instruments through which private behavior can be ‘steered’ include the imposition of 
information duties – one of the favourite approaches in large part of EU consumer law – a 
system of incentives and disincentives, as well as various rules of conduct with more or less 
bite. Fields which present highest risks coupled with higher social and economic relevance, 
such as notably in the case of the financial sector, present that aspect particularly clearly. 
Certainly, there is not only one strategy through which that objective is achieved. Therefore, 
in the case of consumer credit and mortgage law, we have witnessed a progressive shift from 
an approach based on the information paradigm to forms of regulation without clearly 
defined sanctions for non-compliance to, more recently, more defined sanctions. Similarly, 
the approach of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID, now MiFID II, and 
Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation or ‘MiFIR’) meant to impose ‘know-your-
customer’ and ‘know-your-product’ obligations create a new level of control on the activities 
that can be performed by private individuals when these involve a considerable level of 
(systemic) risk.  
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The question here is not whether those approaches should be welcomed or not, or if they are 
sufficiently effective; what is more relevant to point out is that regulation (effective or not, 
controversial or not) is more incisively affecting private autonomy further confusing the 
already blurred line between public and private law. 
 
VI. Functionalisation of Tort law  
In EU Liability Law, what Duguit refers to as the ‘conception traditionnelle’ is inapt. This 
traditional conception of private law (the individual) as dominium, and public law (the state) 
of imperium in public law
71
 is gradually being displaced by a law of societal responsibility 
for third-party harms. This is distinct from ‘the social’, which was concerned with group-
(social) justice in tort law. Instead, the European Union (particularly the Court of Justice of 
the European Union) is constructing a liability regime - in bits and pieces – that attempts to 
make society itself responsible for societal risks.
72
 This is achieved by expanding the 
addressees of liability in EU law. Private actors are given public or societal responsibilities 
(market making and regulation) while public actors are treated as if private actors (no 
sovereignty, liability without fault). These changes are most obvious in the case-law 
surrounding the New Approach to Technical Standards, but functionalization of roles (market 
building and regulation) is a wider phenomenon. 
The two-tracks of liability traditionally have been the Product Liability Directive 
(85/374/EEC) and state liability.
73
 The Product Liability Directive is a break-even point, 
which is on the precipice between the social and the post-social thinking of the internal 
market project. Duguit would surely have recognized the underlying philosophy of this 
recital: ‘liability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole means of adequately 
solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment of 
the risks inherent in modern technological production.’ However, the justification for 
harmonising liability – the building of an internal market – would have been anathema to him 
because it is no longer rooted in social justice, but instead instrumentalises the individual to 
build markets. When these two concerns conflicted, it was the market that won out in cases 






 On the other side, state 
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liability is a residual remedy that is activated almost exclusively in cases where the state fails 
to implement EU law, but it has been enlarged in recent years into misapplication of EU law 
cases.  
The interesting theme in state liability cases is that the state is not recognized as sovereign – 
instead, it is treated like an administrative agency which exercises discretion according to a 
test of sufficiently serious breach of EU law. These two branches of law are coalescing now 
in regulated markets for goods where state liability and private liability commingle – and are 
supplemented by a third and fourth route to liability, namely the responsibility of private 
actors for public functions and the possibility of individual responsibility in EU law.
77
  The 
idea that rights have a social function remains; however, how social solidarity is achieved 
appears to require addressees of liability to fulfil, simultaneously, several functions – 
building a market and regulating the risks attendant to the market. In what follows, we will 
examine the slow emergence of what we refer to as the third route to liability, namely the 
liability of private actors for failure to fulfil (traditionally) public functions.
78
 
The New Approach to Technical Standards is an important testing ground for these claims. 
The New Approach at a most basic level provides market access in the absence of legislation 
on product standards. Instead, following the logic of Cassis de Dijon, mutual recognition of 
standards takes its place, which allows for proportionate measures in the name of health and 
safety.
79
 The formulation of standards is largely assigned to private standardization bodies, 
and compliance and monitoring is assigned to mostly private notification bodies in 
accordance with a notification procedure.
80
 The relevant producer may then select a 
notification body from a list, which certifies product compliance at the pre-market stage and 
has some post-market compliance duties. The producer, in essence, contracts for compliance 
and monitoring with the notification body. Post-market, state regulatory bodies, also have 
duties to ensure compliance with standards.
81
The notification bodies are, in theory, 
supervised also by the public authority. The New Approach clearly solves a problem of 
decisional supranationalism by co-opting private actors into a regulatory framework that 
mixes private regulation and public supervision, bypassing the need for EU-level legislation, 
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which would be cumbersome and inefficient. But who’s liable if the system breaks down? 
Can Duguit help us? 
One of Duguit’s methods was to look to case-law to develop theory. In his methodology, this 
is a posteriori as distinct from a priori. When we examine the case-law we find an emerging 
law on the liability of secondary tortfeasors emerging ‘in bits and pieces’. The most recent, 
relevant case is Schmitt.
82
 In that case, the relevant question obtained to the liability of a 
notification body under the (old) Medical Devices Directive (Directive 93/42/EEC).
83
 That 
Directive sets out several pre- and post-market surveillance requirements.
84
 It will be recalled 
that PIP (Poly Implant Prothèse) went bankrupt after it emerged that their managing director 
had been fraudulently filling silicone implants with low-grade silicone leading to accusations 
that it harmed women. The company, PIP because insolvent, could not be pursued in national 
law or per the Product Liability Directive (organizational liability), so the claimants brought 
class action claims in a number of jurisdictions including France and Germany against TÜV, 
the notification body (secondary tortfeasor).   
The relevant legal questions were whether, first, the Medical Devices Directive contemplates 
the liability of notification bodies and, secondly, whether this gives rise to individual causes 
of action or ‘subjective’ rights based on the Directive. The CJEU held that Directive 
93/42/EEC did contemplate liability pursuant to the consumer protection dimension of the 
Directive. The Court noted that there was a general obligation to discharge surveillance 
powers with due care and diligence or else the obligations under the directive would be ‘dead 
letter’.
85
 However, following Paul,
86
 it did not give rise to a subjective right based on EU 
law.
87
 The Court, further, seems to equate recovery against the notification body and 
recovery against the state.
88
 Thus, from the point of view of consumer protection, a rather 
unsatisfactory picture emerges: the CJEU held that while notification bodies and the state 
may be addressees of liability, based on an interpretation of the Directive, EU law creates an 
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obligation, but national law must provide the corresponding right or cause of action.
89
 
Nonetheless, the import of such a judgment should not be underestimated – alongside the 
organizational liability introduced by the Product Liability Directive is an emerging 
governance or network liability of secondary tortfeasors which does not distinguish formally 
between private and public actors. In other words, all parties in the regulatory process – 
whether formally designated public or private have duties under EU law which, ex hypothesi, 
give rise to liability when they are breached. These may be breached on several legal bases – 
whether based on product liability law (‘producer’ liability), qua individual 
(AGM.COS.MET), qua state or qua ‘private’ certifiers fulfilling regulatory functions. This 
emerging law is taking small steps, to be sure, but it is important to bear in mind the 
underlying concept. That is, EU law imposes duties on parties not only to open markets, but 
to regulate them for risks.  
What the CJEU focuses on is their function in an overall, transnational governance 
architecture of ex ante and ex post regulation. Duguit would surely have recognized this for 
what it is: yet another step in the erosion of the public-private divide, and, from a tort law 
perspective, the socialization of risks. Micklitz might argue that this reflects a concept of 
societal responsibility, as distinct from social justice, where private actors incur liability for 
failing to fulfil public functions and public actors are submitted to the discipline of private 
law remedies on an equal footing with private actors.
90
 More broadly, it is yet more evidence 
of the de-centring of the state in society and the challenges it poses in terms of developing 
liability rules for heterarchical regulatory networks. 
 
VI. The return of sovereignty? 
 
Duguit’s analysis is grounded in a critique of the traditional notion of sovereignty. It is the 
attenuation of that principle which leads to the above-mentioned developments both in public 
and in private law, as de même que disparaît l’autonomie de l’individu, de même disparaît la 
souveraineté de l’État’.
91
 If these tendencies characterise the so-called second globalisation 
of legal thought, as described by Kennedy, the same trend of attenuation of sovereignty 
became more explicit in the third phase of that globalisation, characterised this time by a 
move towards neoliberalism and transnationalism. In that context, state sovereignty is 
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confronted with new international, supranational, and transnational actors, challenging the 
state as the sole forum of law-making.  
These additional layers of regulatory complexity aggravated the crisis of sovereignty - at least 
of external sovereignty - which even appeared too compromised with the disasters produced 
by aggressive forms of nationalism in the twentieth century, so that a ‘mutual limitation of 
sovereignty’ appeared as an effective way to ensure peace in Europe.
92
 While the global 
reach of the economic system continues to underline the increased interdependence of 
countries and private actors at the transnational level, facilitated and intensified by the 
development of technology,
93
 at the theoretical level system theory suggests the 
irreversibility of increased complexity, becoming the reference point for the 
conceptualisation of transnational law. 
But this state of affairs is currently facing resistance. On the one hand, realist economists and 
sociologists continue sagaciously emphasising that, even in the transnational context, the 
State is in fact still the most relevant actor,94 and that despite the attempts of liberalising the 
movement of factors of productions - one of the aspects which are suggested as being at the 
basis of transnationalisation - states in fact still keep a strong and sometimes dramatic control 
over the circulation of some of those,
95
 so that transnational theorists might underestimate 
how states continue to pursue overt and covert mercantilist policies. On the other hand, 
international and supranational institutions are contested, as they are continuously challenged 
by the changing preferences of sovereign states. The EU, with its reliance on a ‘pooled 
sovereignty’
96
 and its extensive liberalisation of factors of productions, is in fact also crossed 
by sovereigntist tendencies, either of a nationalist identitarian or a national democratic 
inspiration, which question its existence or its current supranational structure, regarded as 
oppressive either of national identities and therefore as a threat to the ‘nation state’, or of 
social conflicts and therefore as a threat to the ‘welfare state’.97 In this intricate political 
scenario, in which the interconnections of external and internal sovereignty become more 
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 is Duguit’s view of private law which takes as its starting point a critique of 
sovereignty still relevant?  
 
Even leaving aside the most evident instances represented by the defeat of the idea of a 
common European sales law, repercussions for private law are immediate: the question is 
whether a sovereign state which is pursuing a protectionist policy accept forms of 
instrumentalisation of private autonomy meant to build an internationally competitive 
market? Will a domestic court award damages based on the economic considerations of a 
transnational standardisation body instead of its own criteria of justice possibly rooted in 
specific social notions of the good? Is national democracy even compatible at all with 
international economic integration, to the extent that the latter limits the room of manoeuvre 
of the former?  
 
As Hans Micklitz has pointed out, in any case, there does not appear to be a ‘safe way back’ 
to the nineteenth or the twentieth century.99 Neither does the current sovereigntist tendencies 
- if there is anything inherently new about the message, considering the uninterrupted 
relevance of the State in world politics - necessarily point to the imminent reversal of the so-
far described transformations of private law. Duguit’s critique of sovereignty was not 
primarily inspired by ideological preferences - even despite the particular historical period in 
which he wrote - but instead on pragmatic considerations relating to organic solidarity: 
looking at la réalité of his time which had less to do with the position of France in the 
international context and more with the development of industrialisation and the simple 
desire of the citizens of having electricity provided in their houses. By those lights, the 
renewed appeal of nineteenth-century sovereignty cannot coincide with the restatement of 
nineteenth century law. Society has become too complex – this is Duguit’s message – for 
simple, ideological solutions to societal problems.  
 
There is surely a lesson to be learned for scholars faced with contemporary upheavals 
brought about by intensified transnationalism in law and economy. For Duguit, and for 
contemporary scholarship, grounding legal analysis on a pragmatic look at the reality of 
social facts, with a (post)modern sensitivity to the ‘réalité’ that many of those facts are not 
given but constructed, resounds as a valuable suggestion for resisting the symbolic appeal of 
renewed, but atavistic, political idealisms. New ways to re-embed the social in a transnational 
setting are required. In this respect, private law has an important but unrealized role to fulfil. 
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